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a similar manner with freehold estates, the legislature has generally
explicitly specified that certain leases are covered by that statute. 42 This
practice avoids the confusion resulting where the legislature redefines
"real property" for various purposes.4 3
That an estate vests in the lessee after actual entry is not questioned. 44 However, some doubt remains as to the nature of the lessee's
interest prior to actual entry. Although Justice Pearson held45 that the
Statute of Uses obviated the doctrine of interessi termin, 46 subsequent
courts have discussed the doctrine of interessi termini without mentioning the effect of the Statute of Uses.47 Thus the doctrine of interessi
48
termini may still exist in North Carolina.
An estate for years was classified as personal property at common
law; North Carolina's construction statute encourages strict construction
of specific statutes subjecting estates for years to the law of real property; specific. statutes have been well-drafted and clearly state if leases
are to be governed by them; the doctrine of interessi termini may still be
hanging over the court; all these factors support the court's conclusion
in the principal case that estates for years are personal property.
HENRY

E.

COLTON.

Real Property-Spite Fences
B built a "spite fence" 1 on his own property, within one and one-half
inches of the windows of the house of A, adjoining landowner, effectively
cutting off light and air therefrom, whereupon A secured an injunction
ordering removal, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, on appeal,
reversed. The court held that malicious motive did not render a lawful
2
use of property unlawful, that motive in such use was immaterial.
The authorities are agreed that where the motive in erection of the
"'Example: N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §22-2 (". . . and all other leases . . .
exceeding in duration three'years from the making thereof... ."). But cf. N. C.
GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-76.
"'Example: WASH. REV. STAT. (1931) §2303 (As used in criminal code "real
property" includes every estate, interest and right in lands, tenements and
hereditaments.").
"Williams v. Randolph & C. Ry., 182 N. C. 267, 108 S. E. 915 (1921) (assignment distinguished from lease in that a lease creates an estate in land) ; Moring
v. Ward, 50 N. C. 272 (1858); 2 BL. Comm. *144.
'Moring v. Ward, 50 N. C. 272, 275 (1858).
462 BL. Comm. *339.
"See Bunch v. Elizabeth City Lumber Co., 134 N. C. 116, 118, 46 S. E. 24, 25
(1903) ; State v. Boyce, 109 N. C. 739, 748, 14 S. E. 98, 100 (1891) (concurring
opinion); Barneycastle v. Walker, 92 N..C. 198 (1885).
"'1 MoaREcAfs LAW LcTuREs 531 (Dean Mordecai said: "I will back up
Judge Pearson against the field.").
'For definitions of the term "spite fence," see Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala.
381, 385, 58 So. 283, 285, 40 L. R. A. (N. s.) 129, 131 (1912) ; Burris v. Creech,
220 N. C. 302, 304, 17 S. E. 2d 123, 124 (1941) ; 39 WoRDs AND PHRASES (perm.
ed.) 816.
'Cohen v. Perrino, 50 A. 2d 348 (Pa. 1947).
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structure was primarily beneficial or for a useful purpose of the landowner, and only incidentally malicious, the injury to the adjoining landowner is damnum absque injuria.3 Business competition,4 securing
privacy to premises, 5 building fence to serve as boundary line fence,6
deadening of incoming noises,7 and even moving of dilapidated dwelling
onto vacant lot in such position as to obstruct light and air s have been
held to constitute dominant motives of beneficial use.The question before the court in the principal case was what if the
landowner's motive in erecting the structure was not beneficial but
malicious?
This court answered that motive was immaterial. There is much
authority in support of its view.9 This is based on the common law
theory of absolute ownership of land and is derived from the proposition
that, to prevent the acquisition of a negative easement of light and air
over property, the owner of such property, of necessity, must obstruct
the passage of light- and air. In protection of his property in this
manner, his motive, even if purely malicious, is of no consequence.' 0
The explanation of the common law view is aptly put by Dean
Pound:
"To the nineteenth century way of thinking the question was
simply one of the right of the owner and of the right of his neighbor. Within his physical boundaries the dominion of each was
complete. So long as he kept within them and what he did
within them was consistent with an equally absolute dominion of
the neighbor within his boundaries, the law was to keep its hands
off. For the end of law was taken to -be a maximum of selfassertion by each, limited only by the possibility of a like self2 C. J. S., Adjoining Landowners §51; see Note, 133 A. L. R. 691, 701 (1941)
and cases there cited.
"Gallagher v. Dodge, 48 Conn. 387, 40 Am. Rep. 182 (1880). Contra: Parker
v. Harvey, 164 So. 507 (La. App. 1935) (where competitive motive in erection
ignored
as factor in determining liability).
5
D'Inzillo v. Basile, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 293 (1943) ; accord: Stroup v. Rauselbach,
217 8Mo. App. 236, 261 S. W. 346 (1924).
.,ee Giller v. West, 162 Ind. 17, 69 N. E. 548 (1904).
7
Daniel v. Birmingham Dental Manuf. Co., 207 Ala. 659, 93 So. 652 (1922).
8
White v. Bernhart, 41 Idaho 665, 241 Pac. 367, 43 A. L. R. 23 (1925).
'Biber v. O'Brien, 138 Cal. App. 353, 32 P. 2d 425 (1934); Fisher v. Feige,
137 Cal. 39, 69 Pac. 618 (1902); Honsel v. Conant, 12 Ill. App. 259 (1882);
Giller v. West, 162 Ind. 17, 69 N. E. 548 (1904) ; Triplett v. Jackson, 5 Kan. App.
777, 48 Pac. 931 (1897); Saddler -v. Alexander, 56 S. W. 518, 21 Ky. Law Rep.
518 (1900) ; Lord v. Langdon, 91 Me. 221, 39 Atl. 552 (1898) ; Rideout v. Knox,
148 Mass. 368, 12 Am. St. Rep. 560 (1889) ; Bordeaux v. Greene, 22 Mont. 254,
56 Pac. 218 (1899); Howe v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 150 S. W. 2d 496
(Mo. App. 1941) ; Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73, 42 N. E. 765 (1896) ; Karasek
v. Peier, 22 Wash. 419, 61 Pac. 33 (1900) ; Koblegard v. Hale, 60 W. Va. 37, 53
S. E. 793 (1906) ; Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 83 N. W. 308 (1900). See
Capifal Airways v. Indianapolis Power and Light Co., 215 Ind. 462, 466, 18 N. E.
2d 776, 778 (1939). The United States Supreme Court recognized this line of
cases in Camfield v. United States, 167 'U. S. 518, 523 (1896) as the majority
view, but termed it "unjust."
" Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73, 42 N. E. 765 (1896).
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If, therefore, he built a fence eight feet high

cutting off light and air from his neighbor

..

. this was consistent

with his neighbor's d6ing the same; it was an exercise of his incidental jus utendi, and the mere circumstance that he did it out of
unmixed malice was quite immaterial since it in no way infringed
the liberty or invaded the property of the neighbor." ' "
In this country today the utility element of the common law theory
has disappeared, for the doctrine of ancient lights is not generally applied. 2 And an easement of light and air cannot be acquired by prescription. This also is the law in Pennsylvania."3
In opposition to the principal case stands the modem trend allowing
redress in the spite fence cases' 4 and the criticism that the common law
doctrine stated above has received in the better decisions.
For many courts have vigorously asserted that motive was of prime
importance in these cases.15 Thus spite structures have been held private
nuisances and abated,'0 or damages have been allowed.' 7 This line of
decisions proceeds on the theory that the right to use one's property primarily for the purpose of injuring others is not a right of ownership,' 8
that instead, there must be legal cause or excuse for injury to another to
render it remediless.' 9 The North Carolina court in Barger v. Barringer,20 a leading case for this view, declares that every person, in the
use of his property, should avoid injury to his neighbor as much as
possible. The reasonableness of an interference with a landowner's use
" PouND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 196.

124 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §1194 n. 74 (3rd ed., Jones, 1939) and cases there
cited.3 Contra: Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643 (1873).
" Beckershoff v. Bomba, 112 Pa. Super. 294, 170 Atl. 449 (1934); Haverstick
v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368 (1859).
"Note, 11 VA. L. Rnv. 122 (1925) for development of trend. See note 15
infra for later cases.
'5Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283 (1912) ; Griffin v. Northridge,
64 Cal. App. 2d 69, 153 P. 2d 800 (1944); Hornsby v. Smith, 191 Ga. 491,
13 S. E. 2d 20, 133 A. L. R. 684 (1941); Humphrey v. Mansbach, 265 Ky.,675,
97 S. W. 2d 573 (1936); Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507 (La. App. 1935);
Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N. W. 838, 8 L. R. A. 184 (1888) ; Dunbar v.
O'Brien, 117 Neb. 245, 220 N. W. 278, 58 A. L. R. 1033 (1928) ; Burris v. Creech,
220 N. C. 302, 17 S. E. 2d 123 (1941); Barger v. Barringer, 151 N. C. 433,
66 S. E. 439, 25 L.'R. A. (N. s.) 831, 19 Ann. Cas. 472 (1909) ; Horan v. Byrnes,
72 N. H. 93, 54 AUt. 945 (1903); Hibbard v. Halliday, 58 Okla. 244, 158 Pac.,
1158, L. R. A. 1916F, 903 (1916); Racich v. Mastrovich, 65 S. D. 321, 273 N. W.
660 (1937). Note, 18 N. C. L. REv. 261 (1940).
" Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283 (1912) ; Hornsby v. Smith, 191
Ga. 491, 13 S. E. 2d 20 (1941) ; Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507 (La. App. 1935) ;
Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N. W. 838 (1888) ; Burris v. Creech, 220 N. C.
302, 17 S. E. 2d 123 (1941); Horan v. Byrnes, 72 N. H. 93, 54 Atl. 945 (1903).
"Griffin v. Northridge, 64 Cal. App. 2d 69, 153 P. 2d 800 (1944) ; Humphrey
v. Mansbach, 265 Ky. 675, 97 S. W. 2d 573 (1936) ; Barger v. Barringer, 151 N. C,
433, 66 S. E. 439 (1909); Hibbard v. Halliday, 58 Okla. 244, 158 Pac. 1158
(1916).
"See Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 389, 37 N. W. 838, 842 (1888).
" Barger v. Barringer, 151 N. C. 433, 66 S. E. 439 (1909).

20 Ibid.
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2
of his land may well depend upon the actor's motive in interfering '
Pennsylvania has a statute which declares a fence erected or main22
Erecrained solely with a malicious motive to be a private nuisance.
a
made
tion or maintenance of a structure of this nature is further
suburban
misdemeanor.0 However, the statute is only applicable to
districts of cities of the first class (those with one million of population).
Inasmuch as the opinion of the supreme court, as well as that of the
chancellor in the trial. report, did not mention the existence of the
4
statute, its operation apparently does not extend to the locus2 involved
in the .principal case.
Thirteen other states have enacted statutes prohibiting or giving
some remedy to persons injured by the erection or inaintenance of
spite fences. 25 The Pennsylvania statute is unique in its application to
limited areas within the state. The statutes are construed strictly in
favor of the owner of the structure as they are in derogation of the
common law. 26 The statutes are interpreted to require that malice must
be the dominant motive in the erection.2 7 Their constitutional validity
has been upheld generally under the police power of the various
28
jurisdictions.
"PROSSER, TORTS §5 n. 59 (1941). Compare American Bank and Trust Co. v.

Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U. S. 340 (1921) with South Royalton Bank v. Suffolk
Bank, 27 Vt. 505 (1854) and Silliman v. Dober, 165 Minn. 87, 205 N. W. 696

(1925) with St. Charles Mercantile Co. v. Armour and Co., 156 S. C. 397, 153
S. E. 473 (1930).
21 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1946) tit. 53, §4231. It shall be un-

lawful for the owner or occupant of any improved premises, in any suburban district of a city or borough (whether the premises concerned be assessed at rural,
suburban, or city rates) to erect any fence, or structure resembling a fence, or to
reerect during the jrocess of repairing, any fence previously erected, upon any
part of the front yard, lawn, or space of said premises, or on or along the boundary
line thereof, of a greater height than four feet, if the height in excess of the said
four feet is unnecessary, or if the same is maliciously erected, elevated, and maintained for the purpose of annoying the owner or occupant of the adjoining premises. Every such fence or structure, so.maliciously erected, elevated and maintained
in excess of four fiet in height, shall be deemed and is hereby declared to be, a
private nuisance.
" PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 53, §4232. Any person or persons erecting and maintaining the fence or structure described in section one hereof (§4231
above) as unlawful and prohibited, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and
if convicted thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor
more than two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less
than thirty days or not more than six months, or by both fine and imprisonment
to said respective amount and extent, at the discretion of the trial judge.
450-452 Wharton Street, Philadelphia, Pa.
"The statutes are collected and discussed in Note, 25 Ky. L. J. 356 (1937).
One Hundred and Twenty-Two East Fortieth Street Corp. v. Dranyam
Realty Corp., 226 App. Div. 78, 234 N. Y. Supp. 384 (1929).
" Healy v. Spaulding, 104 Me. 122, 71 Adt. 472 (1908) ; Rideout v. Knox, 148
Mass. 368, 19 N. E. 390 (1889) ; Hunt v. Coggin, 66 N. H. 140, 20 At. 250 (1889).
" Saperstein v. Berman, 119 Misc. 205, 195 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1922); Rideout
v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N. E. 390 (1889). See Camfield v. United States, 167
U. S. 518, 523 (1896).
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The Pennsylvania statute and the Restatement of Torts,20 as well as
a recent appellate decision pointing the way,3 0 should have enabled the
court to find a basis for a principle more in keeping with the needs of
the community.
G. L. GRANTHAM, JR.
2'4 RESTATEMENT,

TORTS §829 (1939) ...

An intentional invasion of another's

interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable and the actor is liable
when the harm is substantial and his conduct is
(a) inspired solely by hostility and a desire to cause harm to the other; or
Lb) contrary to common standards of decency.
Illustration:
A and B own adjoining residences. A quarrel between them results in hard
feelings, and A builds a fence 25 feet high along the boundary between his lot
and B's lot. A's sole purpose in building this fence was to annoy B by shutting
out the light and view from his windows. A's conduct is malicious and he is
liable to B.
30 Feathers v. Baer, 52 Pa. D. & C. 305 (1944) (where a spite fence was abated
by mandatory* injunction even in absence of application of the Pennsylvania*
statute).

